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Abstract
The success of science, especially physics, is often invoked as con-
trasting with the degeneration of world-views involving immaterial
persons. A popular question from the 17th century to the 21st is
how human minds/souls could interact with bodies in light of physi-
cal conservation laws. Leibniz invented this objection and wielded it
to motivate his novel non-interactionist dualism, pre-established har-
mony.
A historical treatment of how this objection has been made over
the centuries vis-a-vis the growth of knowledge of physics and logi-
cal persuasiveness is desirable. Given the massive amount of mate-
rial, selectivity is necessary. This paper covers the period until Eu-
ler. While physics has of course advanced subsequently, most of these
advances are either irrelevant or perhaps even harmful to Leibniz’s
objection (except General Relativity). Many of the most important
advances, such as the connection between symmetries and conserva-
tion laws (known to Lagrange in the early 19th century), were in any
case unknown to philosophers. The 18th century debate involved lead-
ing figures in an era when physics and philosophy were less separated.
Thus the 18th century debate, normatively construed, is instructive
for today.
Keywords: vis viva, conservation laws, mind-body problem, Euler, Carte-
sianism
1 Introduction
This paper explores the early history of an argument, due originally to Leib-
niz, that the conservation of momentum and energy (or its ancestor vis viva)
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poses an objection to mental causation construed as the influence of a men-
tal substance or mental properties on the physical, presumably the brain or
body of the mind in question. This paper adds an historical angle to the
more normative considerations of the previous articles in the series. The first
paper [Pitts, 2019a] considered the logic of the objection, especially noticing
aspects of physics between the mid-19th century (roughly the level typically
employed in the philosophy of mind literature) and the 1910s, when local
field theories became standard and the symmetry-conservation law link was
fully understood due to the work of Emmy Noether. This paper found that
such mental causation indeed causes energy and momentum not to be con-
served, pace many dualist efforts or claims to respect conservation during
the last century, and this result follows clearly from Noether’s converse of
her first theorem. Noether’s first theorem says that symmetries imply con-
servation laws, so the converse is that conservation laws imply symmetries
[Noether, 1918], or contrapositively, non-symmetries imply non-conservation.
The symmetries of time- and space-translation invariance fail because the
mind acts in certain places and times and not others, or more generally does
not act in the same way at every point in space-time. However, the claim
that conservation holds in the brain is obviously equivalent to a denial of
the type of mental causation in question. Thus the erstwhile argument re-
duces to question-begging or an incredulous stare. That the argument is
question-begging has been claimed occasionally in the last century or so
[Ducasse, 1960, Averill and Keating, 1981, Larmer, 1986, Plantinga, 2007].
The frequency with which such a claim was made in the 18th century is part
of the topic of this current paper and turns to be higher than one might have
thought. This view has been called the “conditionality” response, because
it takes conservation laws to hold conditional on the absence of non-physical
influence. A companion paper explored the “varying constants” proposal by
E. J. Lowe and showed how it does in fact violate the conservation laws,
contrary to Lowe’s claims [Cucu and Pitts, 2019].
Another paper [Pitts, 2019b] considers the question of whether Einstein’s
General Relativity, a quite innovative theory in may respects and the locus
of a century-long controversy about gravitational energy and consequently
the existence of physically meaningful conservation laws. A few authors
have had the insight to apply General Relativity to the question of mental
causation and energy causation; they invoked a standard gloss that General
Relativity lacks physically meaningful conservation laws and concluded that
General Relativity therefore facilitates such mental causation. This paper,
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however, reaches the opposite conclusion by way of novel calculations that are
free of the interpretive controversy involving gravitational energy: General
Relativity makes such mental causation harder, impossible in the simplest
case but perhaps not in all cases, and the seriousness of the difficulty depends
on background world-view issues such as theism vs. atheism. The theism-
dualism link is of course not unprecedented [Bunge, 1980, Taliaferro, 1994,
McGinn, 1999, Larmer, 1999, Foster, 2001, Meixner, 2004, Plantinga, 2007].
This paper attempts a normative exploration of the history of the issue
from the late 1600s until sufficiently late that useful lessons can be learned
for today. That turns out to be the mid-late 18th century, the time of
Euler. A comprehensive treatment of the issue could fill a book; telling the
reminder of the 320+-year story would fill another book. (To that end, good
leads are available [Heidelberger, 2004, van Strien, 2015].) In the 19th and
20th centuries, the increasing gap between philosophy and what we would
now call physics (including analytical mechanics) makes careful exploration
of how philosophers either used or responded to the energy conservation
objection to interactionism less rewarding, for much the same kind of reason
that Ladyman et al. have warned against the philosophy of A-level chemistry
as the accidental result of insufficiently informed attempts at the philosophy
of physics [Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 24]. Such a normative history of the 19th
and 20th centuries should still be written, but it would tend to undermine the
presumption that contemporary philosophical opinion that claims to respect
science actually succeeds in doing so.
Even a history up to Euler cannot be comprehensive, at least not within
the scope of an article. The mind-body problem was extremely important in
the 18th century Germany [Watkins, 1995b], involving many of the leading
minds in philosophy and even some of the best in natural philosophy/physics.
Serious discussions occurred in French, German and Latin, languages which,
though not neglected here, have gotten less attention (due to the author’s
limitations) than have works written in or translated into English. Nonethe-
less a sufficiently stable picture has emerged. What this work offers is not
a comprehensive picture that enters into the minds of the time and stays
there, but rather a survey informed by a thorough understanding of the
relevant physics (of the modern day but also with an eye to its historical
development), which makes possible a normative perspective. This norma-
tive perspective is especially useful in that the position that will be singled
out as (nearly) correct is one that many today think is (and quite a few in
the 18th century thought was) in tension with physics: that interactionists
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should simply admit that the conservation laws fail in the context of mental
causation. Indeed in the modern philosophy of mind literature, the claim
that such mental causation indeed implies non-conservation and that this
is no serious objection has been considered a bridge too far for almost ev-
eryone but the heartiest of religious a priori metaphysicians. Be that as it
may, that this position follows from understanding the physics (especially
Noether’s first theorem and its converse) is argued by the previous papers in
the series [Pitts, 2019a, Cucu and Pitts, 2019].1
This paper argues a complementary theme, namely, that the rejection of
Leibniz’s argument was the position of not only of some excellent philoso-
phers, but also probably the position of the very best physicists, including
Newton and Euler, more than a match scientifically for Leibniz, Wolff, and
Bilfinger, the most physically astute proponents of the conservation objec-
tion. The normative and historical threads have a certain coherence: if
the physics and logic show that Leibniz’s argument doesn’t work, then good
physicists who were not hostile to broadly Cartesian mental causation should
have noticed, whereas if world-class physicists were unimpressed by Leibniz’s
argument in the 18th century, then it is not surprising that contemporary
physics should cast doubt on the argument. These complementary claims
might appeal differentially to different audiences. It is also noteworthy that
interactionist dualist E. J. Lowe thought that the conditionality view was
unexemplified in the 17th and 18th centuries [Lowe, 2003]; evidently even
those with incentive to know this history might not be familiar with it.
Readers with a bent toward the history of science will notice the forthright
normative stance taken, a stance perhaps in tension with the anti-Whiggish
customs [Butterfield, 1965] of recent decades in that field. Several things
might be said in response. First, it is admittedly not very interesting to
evaluate past actors in terms of knowledge that they could not have had, but
that is not done (or not usually done) here. Second, the history of science
might best be served by a plurality of aims. One aim that some people have
is ascertaining the growth of knowledge (in the philosophical sense involving
truth and justification, or some reasonable approximations thereof). One of
the main reasons that the history of science seems so worthwhile to so many
people—c.f. the history of witchcraft or parapsychology—is the apparent
tendency of science to produce justified true claims about the world (or some
1Another accessible introduction to conservation laws and symmetries for both particle
and field physics is by Manton and Sutcliffe [Manton and Sutcliffe, 2004].
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reasonable approximation thereof). A methodological stance in the history
of science that prevents recognition of the apparent quality of science that
makes the history of science seem important is not obviously healthy. The
aim of ascertaining the growth of knowledge achievable in certain instances,
though not others. Historians of mathematics, for example, seem not to be
reluctant to say that someone proved this, or that that result was false, etc.
Correctness in mathematics is more demonstrable than in say, religious lib-
erty (one of Herbert Butterfield’s key examples in identifying and critiquing
the “Whig interpretation of history”). The conservation argument from Leib-
niz is to a large degree mathematical, so it is not unreasonable that some of
the demonstrable character of mathematics might be inherited. Third, the
dominance of anti-Whiggish views in the history of science has been chal-
lenged recently by Hasok Chang [Chang, 2009, Chang, 2012]. I believe that
this paper’s methodology would not transgress Chang’s broadened approach
to the history of science. Fourth, whereas Whiggish history is written from
the supposedly enlightened perspective of the present, the project at hand
exposes a deep tension between presently widely held views in one community
(philosophy) about physics and the actual content of mathematical theorems
presently known in another community (physics). There is no single contem-
porary perspective against which the past could be judged. Fifth, one often
sees hints that early modernists’ own judgments about which views were
scientifically reasonable color their treatments of this objection. These judg-
ments do not always coincide with those of experts in the relevant physics,
as will appear below. Thus it is appropriate that the latter judgments also
play some role in the interest of balance.
2 Conservation and Mental Causation: Descartes
and Leibniz
As is well known, Descartes held that there is a conservation of the total
quantity of motion in the world. This constancy he motivated by appeal to
divine immutability. Descartes also held that the soul acts on the body, in
particular on part of the brain. Given how Descartes is now used as a poster
child for unscientific a priori metaphysics, it is worth recalling how scientifi-
cally progressive Descartes’s views were in moving away from scholasticism,
eliminating Aristotle’s vegetative and animal souls [James, 2000], and em-
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bracing the mechanical philosophy. Descartes’s views on mental causation
and his claimed constancy of motion appear to be consistent, but unfortu-
nately Descartes’s physics was incorrect. The question arises, therefore, what
would or should Descartes have said if he could have survived into the later
17th century and benefitted from the improved understanding of physics,
especially the conservation of momentum.
At least according to Leibniz, Descartes held that the soul could change
the direction but not the speed of matter, and therefore the soul’s in-
fluence was compatible with Descartes’s law of the conservation of mo-
tion (volume · speed). Leibniz seems to have been rather fond of this
argument, judging by how often he made it [Leibniz, 1997, Leibniz, 1969,
Leibniz, 1981, Leibniz, 1985] [Leibniz and Latta, 1898, paragraph 80, pp.
263, 264] [Mason and Parkinson, 1967, pp. 117, 118] [Schmaltz, 2008,
§4.3.3]. Leibniz could therefore present Descartes’s system as empirically fal-
sified by the progress in understanding conservation laws (especially due to
Huygens, Wallis and Wren [Hugens, 1669, Wallis, 1668, Wren, 1668]) made
after Descartes’s day. Here is how Leibniz expressed the matter in the Theod-
icy :
61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been
discovered since M. Descartes’ day. The first is that the quantity
of absolute force which is in fact conserved is different from the
quantity of movement, as I have demonstrated elsewhere. The
second discovery is that the same direction is still conserved in
all bodies together that are assumed as interacting, in whatever
way they come into collision. If this rule had been known to M.
Descartes, he would have taken the direction of bodies to be as
independent of the soul as their force; and I believe that that
would have led direct to the Hypothesis of Pre-established Har-
mony, whither these same rules have led me. For apart from the
fact that the physical influence of one of these substances on the
other is inexplicable, I recognized that without a complete de-
rangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act physically
upon the body. [Leibniz, 1985, p. 156].
The first conservation law here asserted is that of vis viva, mv2, the ancestor
of (two times) kinetic energy, not speed |v| as Descartes had held. The
second discovery is that of the conservation momentum ~p = m~v. Leibniz is
quite correct that these conservation laws would not hold if souls acted on
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bodies, although whether the result would be a “complete derangement” or
a justified and small deviation is worth considering.
There is, however, a controversy about whether Descartes actually held
the view attributed to him by Leibniz. In particular, Descartes appar-
ently never actually said what Leibniz ascribes to him [Remnant, 1979,
Garber, 1983, Woolhouse, 1986]. Moreover, sometimes he seemed to deny
it [Garber, 1983]. So did Descartes expect conservation to apply even with
influence on bodies from souls? According to Dan Garber,
[t]he overwhelming impression that one gets from the texts is
that Descartes just was not very concerned about reconciling his
interactionism with his conservation law. . . . [T]here is reason
to believe that Descartes may never have been committed to the
position that his conservation law holds universally and may have
allowed for the possibility that animate bodies lie outside the
scope of the laws that govern inanimate nature. [Garber, 1983]
Garber quotes Descartes and intersperses commentary:
“Therefore, except for changes [in quantity of motion] which ev-
ident experience or divine revelation render certain, and which
we perceive or believe to happen without any change in the Cre-
ator, we ought not to suppose that there are any other changes
in His works, lest from that we can argue for an inconstancy
in Him.” Here Descartes clearly admits that there can be vio-
lations of the conservation law, circumstances in which motion
is added or taken away. The reference to divine revelation sug-
gests that some such violations might arise from miracles. But
Descartes also makes reference to violations that “evident expe-
rience . . . renders certain.” An obvious suggestion as to what
Descartes has in mind here is the ability that the human mind
has to set the human body in motion, which, as he told Arnauld,
“is shown to us every day by the most certain and most evi-
dent experience.” This natural reading is confirmed a few pages
later in the Principia, where Descartes is discussing his third law
of motion, a law explicitly governed by the conservation law, in
which Descartes sets out the general features of his account of
impact. Descartes writes: “And all of the particular causes of
the changes which happen to bodies are contained in this third
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law, at least insofar as they are corporeal ; for we are not inquiring
into whether or how human or angelic minds have the force [vis ]
to move bodies.. . . ” [Garber, 1983, emphasis Garber’s, footnotes
suppressed]
Such a reading of Descartes is not confined to Remnant and Garber among
recent writers. According to Woolhouse, “. . . there is reason to think that
the real explanation [for Descartes’ apparently never worrying whether the
action of mind on body involved contravention of his own law of conservation
of motion] is that the law was never meant to cover all changes of motion
of bodies, but only changes of motion of a body caused by the motion of
another body.” [Woolhouse, 1986] Schmaltz thinks Descartes would have let
conservation fail for minds if asked, but probably shouldn’t have on system-
atic grounds [Schmaltz, 2008, §4.3.3]. While the view that Leibniz ascribes to
Descartes might well not have been Descartes’ view (though some have con-
tinued to defend the ascription [McLaughlin, 1993]), and perhaps shouldn’t
have been Descartes’ view, the view at least was held among some Cartesians
and apparently was widely discussed [Woolhouse, 1986] [Schmaltz, 2008, pp.
172, 173].
I have nothing to contribute to this historical discussion, but I recall it
because it shows that Descartes himself might well have had the view that
conservation should not be expected to hold in the context of mental cau-
sation. In that case, Descartes is the first proponent of the “conditionality”
view that conservation holds conditionally upon the absence of non-physical
influence, and a quite distinguished one (in both philosophy and physics) at
that.
3 Conservation among Newtonians: Condi-
tionality?
There seems to have been a tendency among those regarded as Newtonians
to have regarded the conservation laws as applicable (only) in the absence of
mental influence. This section will consider first some key British Newtonians
and then some figures often described as Newtonian on the Continent.
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3.1 Isaac Newton, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke
There is not necessarily a unified position on all matters between Newton
and Clarke, but they agreed at least in maintaining a strong view of mental
causation with mind influencing body and vice versa. An important reason
why is that the Newtonian tradition of forces could include mental forces
[McGuire, 1968]. Newton’s drafts for the Opticks showed his belief in mental
causation: “Seeing therefore the variety of motion (wch we see) in the world is
always decreasing, there is a necessity of conserving & recruiting it by active
principles; such as are (the power of life & Will by which animals move their
bodies with great & lasting force;)” [McGuire, 1968, pp. 169, 170, bracketed
and cancelled]. Again Newton writes:
We find in orselves a power of moving our bodies by or thoughts
(but the laws of this power we do not know) & see ye same power
in other living creatures but how this is done & by what laws we
do not know. And by this instance & that of gravity it appears
that there are other laws of motion (unknown to us) than those
wch arise from Vis inertiae (unknown to us) wch is enough to
justify & encourage our search after them. [McGuire, 1968, p.
171, quoting a draft of Newton’s Opticks ].
Newton in fact quite frequently affirmed strong views of mental causation
[Dempsey, 2006]. His view is perhaps better described as a dual-aspect
monism, not substance dualism [Dempsey, 2006], or perhaps the question is
premature [Stein, 2016]. But whether it is mental substance interacting with
physical substance, or mental properties interacting with physical proper-
ties, or something else, there is a strong emphasis on mind-body interaction.
While the Newtonians denied the conservation of vis viva (energy) within
physics anyway, for Newton mental force evidently was an additional reason
to deny that conservation law.
John Locke, an older non-technical sympathizer of Newton’s, likewise
took mental causation to be clearly real in experience, however little we
might be able to understand it:
Another Idea we have of Body, is the power of communication
of Motion by impulse; and of our Souls, the power of exciting of
Motion by Thought. These Ideas, the one of Body, the other of
our Minds, every days experience clearly furnishes us with: But
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if here again we enquire how this is done, we are equally in the
dark. For in the communication of Motion by impulse, wherein as
much Motion is lost to one Body, as is got to the other, which is
the ordinariest case, we can have no other conception, but of the
passing of Motion out of one Body into another; which, I think,
is as obscure and unconceivable, as how our Minds move or stop
our Bodies by Thought; which every moment we find they do.
[Locke, 1975, Book II, Ch. 23, §28] [Stein, 2016, p. 344]
Locke indeed finds the situation with mental causation perhaps clearer than
that of physical causation, as well as extremely well attested by experience.
It is thus clear what Locke should say about conservation laws in the context
of mental causation, whether or not he addressed the question.
Clarke, the leading early 18th century British philosopher (Locke having
died in 1704), Newton’s stand-in in the Leibniz-Clarke debate, and frequent
writer on topics such as God and the soul, seems to have been at least
implicitly committed to the same view as Newton regarding the conservation
objection. Clarke affirmed libertarian free will—the soul can make event A
or event B happen, without the choice’s being predetermined by the past
or anything else [Clarke and Vailati, 1998]. It would be exceedingly difficult
to reconcile libertarian freedom with the conservation laws, even omitting
the vis viva conservation law that Clarke rejected [Clarke, 1727, Rey, 2018].
Clarke also took immaterial souls to be spatially located and to occupy a
finite rather than point volume [Vailati, 1993, Zimmerman, 2007]; Newton
held an analogous view about minds [Stein, 2016]. Whatever the merits of
such views for understanding the mind itself, at least they avoid throwing up
another large barrier to mind-body interaction.
Thus the Newtonian view clearly affirms strong mental causation and is at
least implicitly committed to the conditionality view, that the conservation
laws hold in the absence of mental causation but presumably not when the
soul or mind is acting on the body. To the conservation objection against
mental causation such persons in effect reply, “of course conservation does
not hold in the context of mental causation; so what?”
In response one might reply that the Newtonians were mistaken on an im-
portant point and that this mistake deprives their position of contemporary
interest. This was the era of the great vis viva controversy over the proper
definition of force [Hankins, 1965, Laudan, 1968, Iltis, 1970, Iltis, 1971,
Gale, Jr., 1973, Heimann, 1977, Papineau, 1977, Terrall, 2004, Smith, 2006].
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The Newtonians were wrong to think that they had to deny the conservation
of vis viva. Vis viva or some recognizable descendent is in fact conserved, as
became clear in the 19th century with the first law of thermodynamics, the
conservation of energy.
While these points are all correct, they hardly render every part of the
Newtonian viewpoint obsolete or of merely historical interest. That is be-
cause already in the 17th or 18th century it should have been clear that
momentum conservation was also involved (as Leibniz himself already said),
the Newtonians affirmed the conservation of momentum in ordinary physical
contexts, and the non-conservation of momentum would occur due to the
soul’s influence on the body. One should notice a contrast between men-
tal force and gravity, which Newton mentioned together. Gravity, an active
force, still satisfies conservation of momentum due to the 3rd law of motion,
that of action-reaction. The 3rd law and the 2nd law together imply the
conservation of momentum. But at least if one has Newton’s strong view of
mental causation, there is no reason even to suspect that the 3rd law of mo-
tion, the action-reaction principle, applies to the soul. So it seems plausible
that Newton would have allowed that the soul violates momentum conserva-
tion. It wouldn’t even make sense to suppose that the body exerts an equal
and opposite force on the soul, so clearly there is no applicable Newtonian
third law of motion to imply the conservation of momentum. (Admittedly
it would be helpful to have more smoking guns on this point—places where
Newtonians explicitly let the conservation of momentum fail.) However, it
is difficult to imagine the best physicists in the world in their eras, Newton
and (as will appear below) Euler, not making such an obvious inference. The
interactionist position clearly implied the falsehood of the conservation of
momentum, a principle that they otherwise accepted within physics. Hence
they seem to have been committed to letting momentum conservation fail in
the context of mental causation. Thus they should have been equally uncon-
cerned if they were to learn, as 19th century people did, that vis viva/energy
is also conserved in physical contexts. Thus one may take the Newtonian
viewpoint seriously in most respects, even granting that vis viva or its de-
scendent is in fact a conserved quantity in ordinary physical contexts. In
short, it seems that Newton was at least implicitly committed to the view
that conservation laws are conditional, and his failure to embrace the con-
servation of vis viva does nothing to undermine the interest of his views
regarding whether conservations undermine mental causation.
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3.2 Willem ’s Gravesande: Conditionality?
An important early proponent of Newtonian natural philosophy (both math-
ematical and experimental) on the continent was Willem ’s Gravesande. In
the highly partisan environment of the vis viva controversy, ’s Gravesande’s
work on collisions found vis viva more appropriate than momentum; this
apostasy led to controversy with the more doctrinaire Newtonian, Clarke
[Clarke, 1727, Costabel, 1964, Rey, 2018]. From a later perspective ’s
Gravesande presents a welcome example of someone accepting what is good
from both sides and arriving at the truth.
Clearly he remained closer to the Newtonian view on mental causation
than the Leibnizian one, being unmoved by Leibniz’s argument. More specif-
ically, ’s Gravesande affirmed mind-to-body causation, which he described as
outside our knowledge, right at the start (pp. 1, 2 of volume 1):
DEFINITION 3.
Natural Phænomena, are all Situations, and Motions, of natural
Bodies, not immediately depending upon the Action of an intelli-
gent Being, and which may be observed by our Senses.
We don’t exclude those Motions out of the Number of natural
Phænomena, which are made in our Body by the Will : In these
we must distinguish what depends upon the Will, from that which
is to be attributed to another Cause. There is Motion made in
a determinate Manner, and at certain Times, which ought to be
ascribed to the Determination of the Will, and does not relate to
Natural Philosophy : But the Motions proceeding from the Ac-
tion of the Muscles, whose Action depends upon some other Mo-
tion, are these natural Phænomena ; but the Motion arising from
the immediate Action of the Mind, and which is entirely unknown
to us, is not a natural Phæenomenon. [’s Gravesande, 1742, pp.
1, 2]
Thus physiology is natural, but the mind’s action the body, though real,
is not part of natural philosophy and, presumably, not subject to physical
laws. While this statement sounds clearly interactionist, there are indications
that at times he left open the door to occasionalism [van Besouw, 2019].
Either way, spirit acts on matter and conservation laws would presumably not
hold. Such views strongly suggest that ’s Gravesande held, or was implicitly
committed to, the conditionality view: conservation laws simply do not apply
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in the context of mental causation.
Given the example of Clarke’s libertarianism, it is noteworthy that ’s
Gravesande was a determinist, not merely a theological determinist such as
one might expect in traditional Dutch Reformed theology, but also a de-
terminist regarding inference from past to future [van Besouw, 2019]. This
must have been a partly psychological, as opposed to purely physical, deter-
minism. Hence determinists will not necessarily have been of a Leibniz-Wolff
stripe regarding the philosophy of mind.
3.3 Madame du Chaˆtelet
Madame du Chaˆtelet played an important role in bringing Newtonian ideas
to France. She also wrestled with the conservation issue in relation to the
mind [Rey, 2017] and seems at least to have entertained seriously the idea
that conservation did not apply in the context of mental causation.
In her correspondence with Maupertuis she exhibited great con-
cern for the implications of the conservation of living force for
free will. Stating early in 1738 that she had read much on the
subject of forces vives, she asked whether the freedom of living
beings to create motion must not be a violation of conservation.
‘I believe myself free’, she wrote, ‘and I do not know whether the
same quantity of force in the universe does not destroy freedom’.
In the commencement of motion, she reasoned, is it not true that
a force is produced which hitherto did not exist? If we do not
have the power to produce motion, then there is no free will. But
if there is free will then it is absolutely necessary that the will
can initiate motion. [Iltis, 1977, footnotes suppressed]
4 Conservation of Force in Leibnizians
4.1 Christian Wolff
While Leibniz’s repeated advocacy of the conservation objection might have
had some effect, Christian Wolff’s use of the same argument appeared in a
work, Vernu¨nfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Men-
schen, auch allen Dingen u¨berhaupt in 1719-20, which drew more than two
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dozen critical responses by 1725 [Watkins, 1995b]. Watkins gives some indi-
cation just how popular pre-established harmony became in Germany (while
occasionalism had considerable influence in France):
The main tenet of Physical Influx is that causation occurs be-
tween substances. [footnote suppressed] That is, the changes
of state in a finite substance that would naturally appear to
be caused by other finite substances [footnote suppressed] are
caused by these other substances. While this tenet may appear
self-evident today, at times during the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries it was the minority view. [Watkins, 1995b]
Wolff’s advocacy of pre-established harmony thus had a considerable influ-
ence. The difficulty of making metaphysical sense out of physical influx was
an important argument. Another influential argument, one more relevant for
present purposes, was the argument from the conservation of force includ-
ing vis viva. In Wolff’s view, interactionism (physical influx) “seems to be
contrary to the order of nature because of the doctrine of the conservation
of forces.” [Blackwell, 1961]. Unsurprisingly, his view is similar to Leibniz’s
on this issue. Wolff’s philosophy was full of what he took to be demonstra-
tions. While he preferred pre-established harmony, he did not demonstrate
it [Blackwell, 1961, Corr, 1974]. Let us encounter Wolff’s objection in his
own words from the later work Psychologia Rationalis. A marginal summary
reads: “Influxus physici cum conservatione virium vivarum pugna.” The
main text begins: “Si anima in corpus & corpus in animam physice influit ;
in toto universo non semper conservatur eadem virium vivarum quantitas.”
[Wolff, 1734, vol. III §578, emphasis in the original] Wolff’s claim that soul-
to-body causation is inconsistent with conservation is of course correct as
far as it goes: in the whole universe the quantity of living force does not
remain the same if souls and bodies act on each other. Whether body-to-
soul causation conflicts with conservation is not so obvious, but soul-to-body
conservation does and it is difficult to see how to have one without the other.
A key question, at least for those not attracted to the Leibniz-Wolff meta-
physical program, is how to show that this consequence is absurd. (Presum-
ably today’s and even 19th and 20th century proponents of this objection
are not Wolffians.) The ease with which more Newtonian authors, includ-
ing first-rate physicists and philosophers, maintained physical influx suggests
that showing the absurdity of non-conservation of vis viva without Leibnizian
or Wolffian metaphysics was not all that easy. This paper aims to survey the
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growth of physical knowledge, not the trajectory of metaphysical opinion,
so distinctively Leibnizian/Wolffian metaphysical reasons, besides being un-
convincing to many in the 18th century and nearly everyone today, are also
irrelevant to the task at hand.
4.2 Georg Bernhard Bilfinger
Bilfinger’s De harmonia animi et corporis humani, maxime praestabilita, ex
mente illustris Leibnitii, commentatio hypothetica is a classic defense of pre-
established harmony [Bilfinger, 1723]. He deploys the conservation of vis viva
objection to physical influx [Bilfinger, 1723, III, pp. 27-29, §32, §33, §34].
Watkins reports that “Bilfinger rejects Physical Influx for many of the stan-
dard reasons (it seems to violate the law of the conservation of motion. . . )”
[Watkins, 1998, p. 144].
Joachim Kintrup gives us more of these reasons:
BILFINGER widerlegt den Influxus physicus damit, daß er un-
vereinbar mit den Naturgesetzen ist. Wenn man diese Argumente
zusammenfaßt, so sind die Grundsa¨tze, gegen die der Influxus
physicus versto¨ßt, folgende:
a Der Satz vom zureichenden Grunde, Ursache und Wirkung
entsprechen sich vollkommen.
b Die Gro¨ße der Kraft ist konstant.
c Der Tra¨gheitssatz oder das Gleichfo¨rmigkeitsges.
d Das Wechselwirkungsgesetz (actio = reactio).
e Es besteht keine Proportionalita¨t zwischen heterogenen Din-
gen.
BILFINGER kann sich außerdem das vermittelnde Medium zwis-
chen Leib und Seele nicht vorstellen, und es wurde bisher nach
seiner Ansicht auch nirgends gefunden.
Auch heute noch sprechen gegen den Influxus physicus die
Naturgesetze, so als wichtigstes Argument das Gesetz von der
Erhaltung der Energie. [Kintrup, 1974, p. 48]
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It is worthwhile to comment on some of these objections. The first, the
principle of sufficient reason, is certainly to be expected of a follower of
Leibniz and Wolff, but it is a principle both controversial and metaphysical.
Furthermore, one can imagine a proponent of physical influx embracing the
principle. Clarke claims to accept the principle [Alexander, 1956], though his
allowing God’s will to be the sufficient reason and allowing God and humans
libertarian freedom make this claim not very convincing, or at any rate not
the same principle that Leibniz envisages. It is easy to imagine, however, a
proponent of physical influx with a compatibilist view of divine and human
freedom. Indeed ’s Gravesande is a good candidate [van Besouw, 2019]. Such
a person would be able to embrace the principle of sufficient reason while
affirming interactionism.
Regarding the conservation laws, one should distinguish between con-
servation as an objection to soul-to-body causation and conservation as
an objection to body-to-soul causation. Regarding the former, the Leib-
nizians are certainly correct that soul-to-body causation would cause conser-
vation of energy and momentum not to hold. But it would help to work
harder to show why this consequence is unacceptable. Rhetoric such as
a “complete derangement of the laws of nature” [Leibniz, 1985, p. 156]
seems both exaggerated and potentially question-begging. Regarding po-
tential question-begging, one of the issues at stake is whether the usual
laws of nature should be expected to hold when such a radically different
and yet antecedently plausible phenomenon as mental causation, one that
also varies over time and from place to place, is in view. Hence to expect
conservation to hold anyway appears to be merely a denial of soul-to-body
causation, which would make a rather tendentious premise in an argument
against soul-to-body causation. Regarding total derangement, one might ar-
gue that minds’ influences are both slight and localized in brains and hence
not a very serious derangement. With the rise of local conservation laws
in continuous physics (of which Euler gave the first example [Euler, 1757],
with the program complete finally in the 1910s with field theories of gravity
[Born, 1914, Nordstro¨m, 1914, Einstein, 1914, Kastrup, 1987, Pitts, 2016]),
one could further respond that conservation laws hold point-by-point rather
than globally in the absence of soul-to-body causation, so conservation will
still hold point-by-point everywhere and always except for the rather small
spatio-temporal regions in which souls act—a region of vanishing proportion
to the universe. Hence Leibniz, Wolff and Bilfinger are right that soul-to-
body causation is incompatible with conservation laws, but they haven’t done
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enough to convince those of different metaphysical persuasions why the lat-
ter group shouldn’t simply bite the bullet. Considering that the Leibnizians
are on the offensive dialectically, and that soul-to-body causation is at least
prima facie one of the most well-confirmed empirical facts available to the
human race, they have a duty not to beg the question. So this objection is
not powerful.
Bilfinger also takes conservation as a reason to doubt body-to-soul cau-
sation [Kintrup, 1974, pp. 22, 47] [Bilfinger, 1723, p. 28 §32]. While he
elsewhere he of course (correctly) criticizes Descartes’s quantity of motion in
favor of Leibniz’s vis viva, the point applies equally well: if body-to-soul con-
servation changes the amount of Cartesian motion in the world, it changes the
amount of Leibnizian vis viva also. One thing that seems unclear is whether
body-to-soul influence really must change such quantities as motion, vis viva,
energy, momentum, or the like. (The conditionality response implies that fail-
ure of conservation here might not be unacceptable if it occurs.) Even if one
takes body-to-soul causation literally, while it is unclear how physical objects
might affect immaterial substances (in the vicinity of a Princess Elisabeth or
Gassendi metaphysical objection to Descartes), it still isn’t altogether clear
why, if somehow this is possible, it should cost physical objects any vis viva,
momentum, or motion. It also isn’t clear why body-to-soul causation has to
be taken so literally. If I stub my toe on a rock, perhaps my soul ‘scans’
the part of my brain connected to my foot, detects damage, and hence feels
pain, without any metaphysical causal juice flowing from my foot to my soul.
(Lewisian counterfactual dependence might do the job nicely.) While scan-
ning sounds anachronistic for the 1720s, the extramission theory of vision
goes back to the ancient Greeks and provides a possible conceptual prece-
dent. Watkins discusses in detail what 18th century interactionists actually
did say in defense of their position [Watkins, 1995a, Watkins, 1998].
Continuing with the objections that Kintrup isolates in Bilfinger, I suggest
that the principle of inertia doesn’t seem to have any clear relevance to
the question of interactionism. Newton’s first and second laws of motion
are quite compatible with interactionism. Newton’s third law is certainly
relevant, though the form of relevance is contested. Bilfinger evidently finds
it disagreeable that the third law (action-reaction) cannot apply to soul-body
interaction. On the other hand, it is hard to see why someone not committed
to Leibnizian metaphysics would even entertain the idea that the third law
would apply to soul-body interaction. Mind-body interaction is motivated,
after all, on daily experience, not on devising a theory of the mind on the
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model of the body. When I stub my toe and feel pain (apparent body-to-
mind causation) or decide to raise my arm and it goes up (apparent mind-
to-body causation), the idea of an equal and opposite reaction is entirely
absent. It is not difficult to notice that the failure of the third law will
lead to the non-conservation of momentum. But such a result seems like an
acceptable consequence: the effect, if real, is small, localized, and confined
to out-of-the-way places, namely brains. Nowadays one could add, in light
of local field theories, that such momentum non-conservation occurs only in
brains, while momentum is conserved point-by-point everywhere else in the
universe, so only a small part of a presumably infinite universe suffers slight
non-conservation in some out-of-the-way places. Such a result is hardly the
death of science. That is especially true if strong views of mental causation
are perhaps required for doing science, as has been argued [Swinburne, 2019].
The lack of proportion between soul and body does seem to pose some
genuine questions. In particular, it seems to follow that there is no built-in
exchange rate between pleasures, pains, willings, etc. on the one hand, and
Joules of work or the like on the other. One cannot know a priori how much
energy one imparts to a ball as a result of undertaking to throw a ball, or how
much pain one will feel in stubbing one’s toe at a particular speed. This lack
of proportion will have consequences for anyone attempting to engineer an
interacting soul-body composite being: many choices will need to be made.
Descartes may have had lack of proportion in mind here:
A sword strikes our body and cuts it; but the ensuing pain is
completely different from the local motion of the sword or of
the body that is cut [Descartes, 1985, Principles of Philosophy
IV.197, 321; p. 284]
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Allen, 2008] attests
to the lack of proportion between the mental and the physical. Locke indeed
explicitly portrays the divine engineer as having made certain choices:
Let us suppose at present, that the different Motions and Figures,
Bulk, and Number of such Particles, affecting the several Organs
of our Senses, produce in us those different Sensations, which we
have from the Colours and Smells of Bodies, v.g. that a Violet,
by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar
figures, and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of
their Motions, causes the Ideas of the blue Colour, and sweet
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Scent of that Flower to be produced in our Minds. It being no
more impossible, to conceive, that God should annex such Ideas
to such Motions, with which they have no similitude; than that
he should annex the Idea of Pain to the motion of a piece of Steel
dividing our Flesh, with which that Idea hath no resemblance.
[Locke, 1975, II.viii.13 lines 23-35, pp. 136-137]
Thus the relation can only be that God has established the connections.2 If
God has done this by engineering human and any other soul-body compos-
ite beings with the appropriate causal powers, then such a view will be an
interactionist view, not an occasionalist one. Doubtless an omnipotent God
is up to the task of making the engineering choices required to effect a more
or less arbitrary trade-off between mental and physical events. A related
question is whether the soul ‘know what it is doing’ in order to do it—must
it know how to excite a certain part of the brain in a certain way, in order to
make my arm go up? While it is clear that an ordinary human agent does
not consciously know how to act on the brain in order to raise his or her
arm, perhaps the divine engineer solved that problem and hid it behind a
more user-friendly interface. Thus it seems that interactionists did not need
to solve these problems, and they aren’t problems in any serious sense given
the theism that was common property in the 1720s.
In short, if one imagines oneself into the mind-set of an early 18th century
Newtonian like Clarke, some of the Leibnizian arguments made by Bilfinger
pick out true and interesting consequences of interactionism, but few provide
much if any reason to deny interactionism. In particular, the more strictly
physical arguments provided little or no reason to deny interactionism, and
the same holds today. On the other hand, the theistic background of the
discussion clearly is also clear, so parts of the discussion are not immediately
applicable today or else show why interactionist dualism is not more attrac-
tive to non-theists. Needless to say, an enormous difference exists regarding
the understanding of the brain between now and 300-odd years ago, so a
posteriori our situation might be very different indeed—but that is a very
different argument.
2The pre-critical Kant held a perhaps stronger view, that interactions between any sub-
stances was only possible via God’s plan. [Laywine, 1994, pp. 37, 38, 42] [Watkins, 1995b]
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5 Pietists & Wolffians for Physical Influx
As Watkins’s title “From Pre-established Harmony to Physical Influx: Leib-
niz’s Reception in Eighteenth Century Germany” [Watkins, 1998] indicates,
Leibniz’s views came to be very influential for some time, but later came to
be widely rejected.
5.1 Andreas Ru¨diger, Pietist Physician
An important early player criticizing pre-established harmony during its era
of dominance was Andreas Ru¨diger in 1727 [Ru¨diger, 1727, Watkins, 1998,
Lorini, 2016]. Ru¨diger was a physician (hence better qualified than most to
discuss the mind and the brain) and a Pietist.
In response to Leibniz’s and Wolff’s other main criticism of Phys-
ical Influx, namely that it violates the law of the conservation
of motion, Ru¨diger remarks that these laws describe only part
of nature, namely its mechanical part, and do not describe the
other forces of nature . . . such as vegetative and animal forces. . . .
Similarly, the soul and the body are not subject to this law of na-
ture, “for the body and the soul do not move like machines”. . . .
[Watkins, 1998, p. 163].
Ru¨diger’s response appears to reject Cartesian mechanism in favor of a form
of vitalism and hence seems logically stronger than necessary to address
Leibniz’s objection. But as a physician Ru¨diger was surely entitled to reject
Cartesian mechanism if it did not strike him as biologically adequate. More
relevant for present purposes is that he accepts the conditionality response
to the conservation objection: conservation holds in the absence of external
force, but not in its presence, such as where and when minds act.
5.2 Johann Christoph Gottsched, Wolffian
Gottsched, though a Wolffian, rejected the Wolffian doctrine of pre-
established harmony. He seems to be a very early example of a phenomenon
that one sometimes still (or again) sees [Hart, 1988], namely, ascribing energy
to the mind in more or less the same sense as physical energy. Gottsched
considered
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. . . whether Physical Influx violates this [conservation of motive
force mv2]. In justifying his negative answer, he uses an example
of a taut bow.. . . Thus, Gottsched can argue by analogy that ac-
cording to Physical Influx the soul can add motion to the universe
or the motion of a body can cause an idea in the soul (possibly
diminishing the amount of motion in the universe) without violat-
ing the ‘corrected’ law of conservation.. . . an interesting reply to
one of the most important objections raised against Physical In-
flux. . . [and] on the basis of Leibnizian principles [Watkins, 1998].
In my opinion this response is less interesting than Watkins finds it, because
it makes no mathematical sense unless one is prepared to ascribe mathe-
matical properties to the mind, which seems itself highly implausible. What
intensity of will to throw a bill trades off against a 1kg mass moving at
1m/s? Whereas any interactionist will presumably need to say that a cer-
tain amount of mental effort produces a certain physical effect (for a given
soul), interactionists such as Gottsched who claim that the conservation laws
hold even given mental causation need for there to be some precise quantita-
tive trade-off such that the total of mental effort-equivalent plus physical vis
viva remains precisely constant, making the mental and physical commen-
surable. While formally claiming to uphold conservation and hence accord
with natural sciences has a superficial pro-scientific flavor, this appearance
is illusory.
5.3 Martin Knutzen, Wolffian-Pietist
Martin Knutzen does not easily fit the Wolffian vs. Pietist dichotomy. While
he is sometimes called a Wolffian, he was an orthodox Christian (not just
professedly like Wolff [Saine, 1987]). Such classification, fortunately, is not
crucial, so I solve the problem through hyphenation. Nowadays Knutzen is
remembered primarily as a teacher of Kant. His attempt to defend phys-
ical influx on Wolffian grounds is striking, though it has been criticized
[van Biema, 1908]. More relevant for present purposes is his treatment of
the conservation objection.3
Knutzen’s main response to the objection that Physical Influx
violates the law of the conservation of motion is to deny that
3Wolff’s oldest philosophical opponent, G. P. Mu¨ller, already in 1722 had denied that
conservation law held in the context of mind-body action. [Erdmann, 1876, p. 68]
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the law holds for mind-body interaction. He notes that the law
has been proven only for elastic bodies, not for inelastic bodies,
much less for the mind and the body.. . . Knutzen even provides a
reason why this law should not hold for the mind. Since Leibniz
derives the law of the conservation of motion from the law of
inertia . . . and . . . the law of inertia does not hold for the mind. . . ,
there is no reason for the conservation law to hold for the mind.
[Watkins, 1998, pp. 178, 179]
Thus Knutzen adopts the conditionality response, which was typical of
Pietists, and which suggests a more sound understanding of physics than
Gottsched displayed.
5.4 Christian August Crusius, Pietist
Crusius was another orthodox Christian who defended physical influx quite
influentially. He is sometimes called a Pietist, but not of the sort that per-
secuted Wolff. Again Watkins can be our guide:
The third objection Crusius considers is the traditional objection
raised against both Occasionalism and Physical Influx (by Leib-
niz and Wolff), namely that Physical Influx would violate both
the law of the conservation of motive forces and the law of the
conservation of motion. Crusius’s full reply is novel; he “bites the
bullet” and rejects as impossible these particular laws of motion,
noting that if they were true, the absurd results would follow
that minds could not cause any motion and, as [Johann Peter]
Reusch had noted earlier, that matter would not be able to fulfill
the purpose for which God intended them [sic], namely to be a
means for rational and free beings. [Watkins, 1998, pp. 193, 194]
Crusius’s response is thus a version of the conditionality reply. Such a reply
does not seem altogether novel in the larger debate if arguably Descartes,
Newton, Clarke, and ’s Gravesande had held it outside Germany, besides the
German authors discussed above. It is, however, the response that propo-
nents of physical influx ought to have made.
22
6 Leonhard Euler, Interactionist
Leonhard Euler’s defense of interactionism, though not as systematic as one
might wish a view on the mind-body problem to be, was a potent and
widely read force against pre-established harmony and for interactionism
[Calinger, 1976]. Euler was, of course, not primarily a philosopher. He was
one of the greatest mathematicians of all time and perhaps the most pro-
lific; his fundamental contributions to mechanics, fluids, optics, and acoustics
make it natural to call him a physicist also (even if the term is anachronistic)
[Calinger, 2007].
EULER (1707–1783) was the dominating theoretical physicist of
the eighteenth century. While his work is undervalued in the usual
vague, historical books and attributions, the short factual history
in the old Handbuch der Physik lists twice as many specific dis-
coveries for EULER as for any other one physicist, earlier or later,
and even at that most of his work is omitted. [Truesdell, 1960,
p. 17]
The Euler-Lagrange equations in analytical mechanics have become crucial
in physics. Euler’s ground-breaking work on continuous media included re-
formulating conservation laws in general to describe place-by-place conser-
vation, not just global conservation (for the world as a whole) [Euler, 1757].
He also write down partial differential equations for fluids without viscos-
ity, the Euler fluid equations, which described conservation of mass and
conservation of momentum. He planned a treatise on fluids based on the
principle of living force until he yielded to a similar plan of Daniel Bernoulli
[Darrigol and Frisch, 2008]. The law of the conservation of angular momen-
tum owes much to Euler [Truesdell, 1964]. It is difficult to overstate Euler’s
contributions in mathematics and physics [Truesdell, 1972]. Though will-
ing to use vis viva where it was useful, Euler reckoned that its conservation
isn’t generically true [Euler, 1746, Calinger, 2016]. Euler’s status as the best
physicist in the middle of the 18th century made his views both influential
and probably as correct as any views available at the time.
As an orthodox Christian and occasionally an apologist [Euler, 1840,
Euler, 1965, Arana, 1994, Breidert, 2007, Knobloch, 2010, Drozdek, 2010,
Knobloch, 2018], Euler did have things to say about spirit-matter inter-
action. He was a staunch interactionist dualist and opponent of pre-
established harmony [Euler, 1926] [Euler, 1840, I Letts. 79-115, II Letts.
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1-17] and of monads [Broman, 2012]. In line with some contemporane-
ous scientific claims, he took the soul to act on the corpus callosum
[Euler, 1840, I, Lett. 94]. He defended the Bible and the existence of
evil spirits both in the Letters to a Princess of Germany [Euler, 1840,
I Lett. 111] and in his earlier defense of the Bible against freethinkers
[Euler, 1965, Knobloch, 2010]. He took the laws of mechanics to be so cer-
tain that a metaphysics of nature must be answerable to mechanics, not
vice versa [Breidert, 2007, Calinger, 1976, Stan, 2012] as the more traditional
Wolffian claim held [Euler, 1750]. Euler’s reliance on the principle of iner-
tia (lack of self-moving ability in mechanics) in application to fundamental
metaphysical reality could be questioned by Wolffians, blunting his attack
on pre-established harmony [Laywine, 1994, pp. 29, 30, 50]. But that is rel-
evant only to Euler’s offensive project against pre-established harmony; his
defensive posture against the Leibniz-Wolff conservation attack on physical
influx is unaffected. Euler “was very careful to exempt the object of rational
psychology—the human soul—from the laws of motion.” [Laywine, 1994, p.
50]
What did Euler have to say about the conservation objection to interac-
tionism? Unfortunately no smoking gun where he explicitly addressed the
question is known to me or, more significantly, to Martin Mattmu¨ller of the
Euler project. So what follows is my own opinion of what Euler probably
thought. Euler obviously knew all and discovered/invented a fair amount of
the relevant physics. Euler was too good a physicist to think interaction-
ism and conservation were compatible. Neglecting gravity, Euler’s equations
implied local momentum conservation, with 3 equations per spatial point
[Euler, 1757], not 3 for the whole universe. Given Euler’s robust view of
mental causation, including libertarian freedom, it seems undeniable that
Euler would have held Newton’s 3rd law likely to fail in mind-body interac-
tion and thus would have simply accepted momentum non-conservation in
line with the conditionality response. In any case Euler cannot have failed
to encounter the conservation objection and evidently was quite unmoved
by it, so his mere example as an interactionist, a critic of pre-established
harmony, and the best physicist in the world presumably had some effect,
whether or not he addressed the objection explicitly. While Euler’s views on
the conservation of vis viva seem ambivalent, the same answer would work
perfectly well in case of full acceptance of that conservation law as well.
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7 Later 18th Century: Interactionism Reas-
cendant
In the later 18th century there was a return to broadly Cartesian interaction-
ism (physical influx) [Watkins, 1995b]. (This included the pre-critical Kant.)
Joseph Priestly mentioned this fact with disapproval:
Neither of these hypotheses [occasionalism or pre-established har-
mony] having given lasting satisfaction, the defenders of the mod-
ern doctrine of immateriality have generally contented themselves
with supposing that there is some unknown real influence between
the soul and the body, but that the connection is a mystery to
us. And this is not the first absurdity, and impossibility, that has
found a convenient shelter under that term. [Priestly, 1777, p.
64]
Earlier Priestly speaks of his own views as having previously been standard
for his day:
Like the generality of christians [sic] in the present age, I had
always taken it for granted, that man had a soul distinct from
his body, though with many modern divines, I supposed it to
be incapable of exerting any of its faculties, independently upon
the body ; and I believed this soul to be a substance so intirely
distinct from, matter, as to have no property in common with it.
Of this several traces may be found in my Institutes of Natural
and Revealed Religion, and probably in some of my other writings.
[Priestly, 1777, p. xi]
Why for present purposes is the 18th century, especially 18th century Ger-
many, so interesting? There are a number of factors. First, there was less of
a split between philosophy and physics (natural philosophy) in that era, so
that many or most people who were experts in one of them would be at least
interested in and tolerably informed about the other. Second, the debate over
theories of the relation of the mind and the body was extremely important in
early 18th century Germany [Watkins, 1995b]. Thus the participants in the
debate were both numerous and in many cases distinguished. Third, con-
temporary analytic philosophy of mind is very poorly informed about this
history, despite the continued use of Leibniz’s argument. Indeed analytic
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philosophy of mind rarely recalls much of anything between Leibniz’s Mon-
adology and the 1910s, such as the fact that interactionism fought back from
being at times a minority view in France and Germany to regain dominant
status. Indeed E. J. Lowe thought conditionality response was unexempli-
fied in 17th-18th centuries [Lowe, 2003]. But as has appeared above, the
view was held by (perhaps) Descartes, (likely) Newton and Clarke, Ru¨diger,
Knutzen, Crusius, and (likely) Euler, among others. This is an extremely
powerful team. Indeed when interactionism fought back from minority sta-
tus at times to become the majority view once more, the bulk of the authors
involved seem to have held to the conditionality response. Fourth, the phi-
losophy of mind literature also has not advanced much in its grasp of relevant
physics. While the 19th century saw the revival of the conservation of vis
viva/energy, and this revival seems to have been the occasion for a revival of
Leibniz’s objection, it is difficult to find a justification for the revival of the
objection. The problem is that there was never any doubt in physics about
the conservation of momentum; if it was reasonable to make an exception to
the conservation of momentum due to mental causation, then it was no less
reasonable to make an exception to the conservation of energy as well. Thus
the 18th century (especially German) debate covered most relevant issues
about as well as, or better than, the subsequent discussions did or have.
The fact that physical influx recovered as the dominant view in the later
18th century indicates that the conservation objection ceased to be regarded
as decisive. To what degree this shift reflects the rejection of Leibniz’s con-
servation of vis viva in ordinary physics (apart from the mind-body problem)
would repay further study. This was the era of theories of caloric, the heat
fluid, a theory that obviously had to perish before the conservation of vis viva
could reappear as the first law of thermodynamics. If the Leibnizian conser-
vation objection ceased to have much force simply because of the rejection
of the conservation of vis viva, then this shift shows how poorly the physics
was understood by those writing on the philosophy of mind. That is because
physical influx was also contrary to the conservation of momentum, a con-
servation law older than, no less fundamental than and, during the 18th and
early 19th centuries, more secure than the conservation of vis viva/energy.
But if on the other hand there was an increased recognition that the hy-
pothesis of physical influx simply deprived one of any reason to think that
the conservation of momentum was (exactly) true (especially in the brain),
then the rejection of the conservation objection would seem to represent an
improved understanding of the basis for conservation and hence an instance
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of the growth of physical knowledge. Such a form of growth of scientific
knowledge of course tends to conflict with the idea that the objection itself
manifests growth in physical knowledge.
Analogous questions apply to the 19th century when, following the re-
vival of the conservation of vis viva/energy and its coronation as the first law
of thermodynamics, the conservation objection to interactionism resurfaced.
Insofar as the argument went like this: (Energy is conserved, interactionism
entails non-conservation of energy, therefore interactionism is false), this re-
vived objection does not represent a growth in physical knowledge. It might,
of course, represent a sincere but ill-informed effort to submit to physics
without understanding it. But if one strips away that mistake, what remains
is a growth of materialist philosophy or perhaps some other doctrines hostile
to spirit-matter interaction.
In the 19th century, one must distinguish between the understanding
of mathematicians doing analytical mechanics and the understanding of
philosophers (and even some physicists!). Mathematicians had the roots
of an understanding that energy/vis viva is conserved assuming the uni-
formity of nature in time [Lagrange, 1997, pp. 233, 234] [Lagrange, 1811,
p. 318] and momentum is conserved assuming the uniformity of nature
across space [Hamilton, 1834, Jacobi, 1996]. Such derivations from vari-
ational principles in physics became widely accepted in physics (not just
mathematics) during the 1910s-20s. In that same era, Noether’s synthe-
sis of derivations from symmetries to conservation laws and a converse
theorem appeared [Noether, 1918, Brading, 2001, Brown and Holland, 2004,
Kosmann-Schwarzbach, 2011]: symmetry ↔ conservation. This work con-
solidated progress in the relation between local field theories of gravity (such
as Nordstro¨m’s and Einstein’s) and conservation laws, removing the last ex-
ample of action-at-a-distance, gravity, and making local conservation laws
the norm. Perhaps ironically, in those same decades quantum physics arose
and showed that ‘classical’ physics, based on variational principles, is not
the last word. Quantum physics, however, either tells basically the same
story about symmetries and conservation laws—witness how quantum field
theory books frequently start with Noether’s theorem—or perhaps is slightly
looser regarding conservation. Thus while a great deal in physics has hap-
pened since Euler’s day, a fair amount of which is permanent progress, little
or none of it tends to strengthen the conservation objection, and some of
that progress might even undermine the objection. That is despite the fact
that the later 19th century witnessed a revival of Leibniz’s objection among
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philosophers—a revival which partly reflects the growth of naturalistic re-
search programs (such as Helmholtz’s) and partly reflects philosophers’ ef-
forts to respect physics while treating conservation laws as a black box based
on authority rather than as inferences from symmetries. Thus the revival of
Leibniz’s objection is certainly professionally excusable, but it owes rather
little to the growth of scientific knowledge.
The converse symmetry-conservation (Noether’s first theorem’s converse),
if anything, weakens the conservation objection because it becomes all the
clearer that the objector needs and yet lacks a reason to think that conser-
vation holds that has some claim on the interactionist. Now symmetry (the
uniformity of nature, that is the denial of interactionism) and conservation
are logically equivalent. The conditionality response is what the interaction-
ist ought to say, though it does not work so well regarding General Relativity
[Pitts, 2019b]. Empirical studies of the brain, on the other hand, certainly do
have a claim on the interactionist’s acceptance. Such studies are, however,
a quite different argument from Leibniz’s, and probably are not best framed
in terms of conservation laws anyway.
It is worthwhile to recall some perspective from Jeremy Butterfield:
This argument [from conservation laws against interactionism] is
flawed, for two reasons. The first reason is obvious: who knows
how small, or in some other way hard to measure, these energy
gains or losses in brains might be? Agreed, this reason is weak:
clearly, the onus is on the interactionist to argue that they could
be small, and indeed are likely to be small. But the second reason
is more interesting, and returns us to the danger of assuming that
physics is cumulative. Namely, the principle of the conservation
of energy is not sacrosanct. The principle was formulated only
in the mid-nineteenth century; and although no violations have
been established hitherto, it has been seriously questioned on sev-
eral occasions. It was questioned twice at the inception of quan-
tum theory (namely, the Bohr-Kramers-Slater theory, and the
discovery of the neutrino). And, furthermore, it is not obeyed by
a current relevant proposal . . . [spontaneous collapse] for solving
quantum theory’s measurement problem.
In short, physicalists need to be wary of bad reasons to
think physicalism is true, arising from naivety about physics.
[Butterfield, 1997, pp. 146, 147]
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What is involved in respecting science? Is it believing one’s secondary
school chemistry textbook, or believing Noether’s first theorem and its con-
verse [Ladyman et al., 2007, p. 24]? The latter is of course more diffi-
cult because it requires encountering much more advanced material. One
should also distinguish among the sciences: physics doesn’t have much of
anything positive to say about Leibniz’s objection (though General Rela-
tivity novelly implies a related objection that isn’t so obviously question-
begging [Pitts, 2019b]), but neuroscience, which studies the relevant system
(the brain), can provide good reasons to doubt interactionism, and has made
considerable progress in that regard. Such progress is thus entirely a posteri-
ori and empirical. Perhaps neuroscience is finally providing the justification
for which physics has long been unjustifiably invoked.
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